The Australian-American Alliance by Catley, Robert
THE AUSTRALIAN 
-AMERICAN 
ALLIANCE
This paper, here slightly abridged, teas presented to a con­
ference on “Australia, Vietnam and the Asian Revolution” 
held in Adelaide in March. The author is a graduate of 
the London School of Economics and holds a Ph.D. from 
the Australian National University. H e is at present lecturer 
in international relations at Adelaide University.
IN TH IS TA PER  1 propose to make a critical examination of 
the American alliance from an Australian perspective. In that 
context I shall be only peripherally concerned with that maze of 
social, economic and diplomatic developments which we term 
the Asian Revolution. But I would like to make two general 
observations on that subject which seem relevant to the present 
discussion.
First, there has grown in Australia a school of thought which 
holds that revolutions a la Vietnam can be expected in  a large 
num ber of Asian, (and other underdeveloped) countries in the 
immediate future. I don’t subscribe to this point of view. Revo­
lutions are extremely difficult things to start and to prosecute; 
successful revolutions as opposed to palace coups, are exceedingly 
rare. Most Asian states are rapidly modernising and the power of 
the modern state to deal with embryonic insurgencies is consider­
able. In  this sense, despite the claims of Peking, time is most likely 
on the side of the big battalions. T he Vietnam insurgency has 
developed under favourable circumstances and yet has taken nearly 
three decades and a heavy toll on Vietnamese lives to reach its 
present stage of considerable strength. T he uniqueness of the 
situation in Vietnam needs to be emphasised both to the romantic 
armchair revolutionaries, understandably elated by T et and its 
aftermath, and to Government supporters, hopefully chastened 
by recent developments, both of whom have, from different stand­
points, espoused the domino theory.
Secondly, I ’m not sure that one should expect, or demand policy 
makers in Canberra to determ ine Australian policy towards a revo­
lution by asking, ‘Is it in the interests of the peasant masses of
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state A-?’ One would expert them to enquire Ms it in Australia’s 
interests?’ On both these criteria I believe it to have been unwise 
for Australia to have participated in the Vietnam War. But in 
fact neither criterion provided the original impetus for involve­
ment, for our masters in Canberra asked ‘Can we resist American 
pressure to despatch a contingent of troops to fight alongside 
those of our ally and protector?' T he location of the conflict was 
all but immaterial. The American alliance has been the corner­
stone of Australian policy in Vietnam and much of Asia: that 
alliance requires a more rigorous evaluation than either the 
Government or most of the official spokesmen for the Opposition 
have been prepared to give it.
W hat is an alliance? An answer to this readily leads to confusion 
between what is and what ought to be. Palmerston, that unsenti­
mental strategist of mid-nineteenth century British foreign policy- 
is reputed to have declared that ‘B ritain has no eternal friends, 
only eternal interests’. On this hard-headed view states should 
ally to pursue interests which they have in common: an alliance 
is a means to an end. To a great extent the American alliance has 
become an all-pervasive end of Australian foreign policy to which 
an alarming num ber of other objectives have been subordinated, 
if not sacrificed. This is not necessarily undesirable. Since Palmers­
ton’s day politics has become popularised and it has become 
necessary for Western Governments to create moral justifications 
for their external behaviour to make it palatable to those they 
represent. Alliances have ceased to be temporary, transitional 
arrangements for the pursuit of lim ited interests; they have 
become, to use the jargon, communities of peaceloving peoples 
dedicated to the pursuit of liberty. Most governments formulate 
these high-minded phrases with some cynicism: after all Greece 
is in NATO, that bastion of democracy, and the Philippines in 
SEATO, an organisation dedicated to the preservation of an 
ostensibly satisfactory status quo. Does Canberra operate with 
such cynicism? One feels not. It seems unlikely that on im portant 
matters of policy the Government regularly asks, those vital 
political questions. ‘W hat are A ustralia’s interests?’ ‘How may they 
be secured most cheaply most effectively, and most certainly?’. 
T o  examine these issues it is necessary to cut through the 
ubiquitous, moralistic verbiage which the Government gives every 
indication of believing. Of course it wants peace in South east Asia, 
but it wants other things more and is prepared to fight for them; 
of course it wants stability, although it will tacitly applaud the 
occasional elim ination of half a million Indonesians because some 
of them are communists; of course it wants regional security, 
whatever that may be. Too often the meaningless propaganda has 
become the substance of policy and provides a panacea, a simple
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answer to difficult questions. T hat is the function of the American 
alliance.
T h e  American alliance has been a major objective of mid 
twentieth century Australian governments. Mooted before 1939 it 
became reality under the external pressures of the Pacific War. 
For the benefit of those inclined to think in terms of political 
obligations and debts it should be recalled that the U.S. fought 
because of Pearl H arbour, not to defend Australia. Following the 
defeat of Japan all the m ajor political parties favoured an 
alliance with the US< which was formed by the Liberal Govern­
ment in 1951 because the Americans, concerned at Mao’s victory 
and the Korean War, were then prepared to form such an alliance. 
It was not then the particular preserve of the Liberals for the 
ALP welcomed the ANZUS Treaty and supports it today. 
ANZUS committed the US to come to Australia’s assistance if 
she were attacked. In 1954 that fraudulent version of collective 
security, SEATO, was deemed to commit America to what Can­
berra euphemistically termed, ‘Australia’s forward defence peri­
m eter’. At the time these seemed astute political moves: they cost 
Australia little and gave her a written guarantee, for what that was 
worth, of American protection. Since that time the price of that 
guarantee has progressively risen while its utility and the possi­
bility of Australia’s invoking it have progressively declined.
T he generation of Australian Liberal politicians that created 
the US alliance and during the 1950s formulated its working 
characteristics shared a num ber of basic assumptions about the 
world and Australia’s place in it. Menzies, H olt and Hasluck 
were the products of the age of M unich and the Japanese con­
quest of East Asia. From M unich they were inclined to draw the 
lesson that accommodation had no place in  foreign policy 
planning; a few, precious few, delighted in their wise perception 
of Chamberlain’s supposed blunder; many more were determined 
not to be wrong again. Like Sir Anthony Eden and Menzies at 
Si*ez, they saw a Red H itler under every Afro-Asian bed and, 
ignoring the relative strengths which destroyed the analogy, pre­
pared to meet force with overwhelming force. Dissident tribesmen 
in  Northeast T hailand  became the Sudetenland Germans; N orth 
Vietnam becomes C hina’s puppet; Sukarno was the ‘petty H itler 
of the Pacific’; or at least played M ao’s Mussolini
From the Japanese thrust south other lessons were learned. It 
presented the prototype for Asian threats to Australia, a piece­
meal conquest of Southeast Asia, a genuine toppling of dominoes. 
T he lesson: to check the yellow hordes as far north as possible. 
T h a t there were fewer Japanese than Commonwealth troops in
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Malaya at the time of Singapore's surrender provided no answer 
to the ‘How many hum an hordes make a flood?’
In the 1950s and 1960s Peking and the communist movements 
in Southeast Asia were accommodated to this perception. It was 
asserted that communism formed a monolithic, militant- atheist, 
aggressive and, worse, racially alien force, presided over by Stalinist 
Moscow and Asian Peking, intent on repeating Japan’s thrust 
to Australia, Canberra appeared to be unaware that communism 
lost its vestiges of universalism in 1914 when the German Social- 
Democrats supported the Kaiser’s War. For the following 50 years 
the press would assert communism’s mythical unity. Mao came 
to power in China, and Ho in Vietnam, without, and to a great 
extent in spite of, Moscow’s ‘assistance’; T ito  found Stalin’s iron 
hand unbearable; the PKI's independence was beyond dispute. 
Except for those satellites established and m aintained with some 
difficulty in  Eastern Europe by the Red Army, the success of 
communist parties has been in inverse proportion to their degree 
of external control; they support a function of their self-sufficiency 
and adaption to local conditions. T h e  Chinese communists are 
aware of this, for it was they, not the NLF, who provided the 
prototype for a war of national liberation. No more than Ho Chi 
M inh are they anybody’s puppets. T he edifice of the communist 
m onolith of the 1950s would have collapsed under the briefest 
of analyses. But it was too useful domestically for the Liberal 
Government to contemplate such action. It became the all embrac­
ing image of the Near North. Aggression equalled communism 
and vice versa.
This threat obsession, compounded by a nationalism prone to 
elevate A ustralia’s significance out of all proportion — one thinks 
of Dame Zara H olt’s (now Mrs. Bate) assertion that the world 
looked to Australia for a lead — and manifested occasionally in 
a m anner alarmingly similar to Afrikaner notions of an embattled 
culture, produced the mythology of the US alliance. T he Americans 
with suitable Australian encouragement, as in SEATO and 
the Vietnam War- would provide a defence in depth against ‘the 
southward thrust of m ilitant Asian communism’. T h e  situation 
worsened in the 1960s for Peking came to direct the more m ilitant 
half of the former monolith. Lin Piao’s1 statement in 1955 that 
Peking supports, indeed encourages, wars of national liberation was 
liberally misquoted, not least of all by Professor Scalapino on 
his periodic visits to keep America’s jun io r partner properly 
informed, as evidence of Peking’s aggressive intent. In  fact what 
M ao’s chief lieutenant stressed was that those revolutionary move­
ments must be indigenous and that they should not depend on
l  P eking R e v iew , 3 Sept. 1965.
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external assistance. W hen the Chinese support war, they mean 
internal war against what the\ believe to be oppressive govern­
ments, not inter-state war. This is a far cry from the Japanese 
analogy and yet all but impossible to establish in the face of the 
neatly simplistic maps depicting red arrows coming from China. 
Not only do these appear in electioneering propaganda with 
the suggestion of a satisfactory formula, ‘Where would 
you draw the Line?'- but such maps are to be found in secondary 
school text books with the suggested topic for students’ essays, 
‘Why does China present a threat to Australia?’ Perhaps the 
answer is that the Country Party fears Chinese encouragement of 
a putative movement dem anding land redistribution in the 
Riverina.
Canberra has also consistently claimed that the US alliance gave 
it a voice in US policy making. Surprisingly, this claim was for 
long believed. Kennedy’s disavowal of Australian policy 011 West 
Irian and America’s changed Vietnam policy over the last year 
should have disabused even the most credulous Australians.
Successive Liberal Governments have propounded this image 
of the world with varying intensity as it suited the state of dom­
estic politics. T o  quote no less an expert than Herman Goering, 
“the people can always be brought to do the bidding of the 
leaders. T hat is easy. All you have to do is to tell them they are 
being attacked and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism ”.
Menzies utilised this mythology with characteristic skill: the 
Communist Party dissolution bill; the Petrov affair, the purchase 
of the wonder plane, the F i l l  to support Liberal fortunes in 
the 1963 election. But if Menzies used the mythology- he kept its 
price low. Until the end of his reign Australia spent almost the 
smallest proportion of her wealth on defence in the Western 
world. Under his successor, Mr. Holt, the enthusiasm with which 
Canberra stepped up the propaganda and increased the defence 
vote to counter the communist threat was alarming.
T he latest encumbent of the Prime M inister’s seat is said to 
represent a “new nationalism ” and to be rethinking Australian 
foreign policy. W hatever the image makers intend by this nonsense 
he is clearly a man of the US alliance despite his equivocal kite­
flying about a continental defence policy. N orth West Cape 
Polaris communications station and the ill-disguised Pine Gap 
installation make this an inescapable fact.
Against this background one may draw up a political balance 
sheet for Australia’s relationship with the US. First, the benefits 
of the US alliance for Australia. It seems to be beyond question 
that an American commitment to defend Australia is worth having.
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This was obtained in 1951. The questions which it raises are not 
so easily resolved: How useful is that commitment? W hat price 
should be paid to ensure that it is maintained? Of more question­
able value to Australia is America’s military presence in South­
east Asia involving as it does not only increasingly ineffectual 
support for pro-Western governments, but also the exacerbation 
of local conflicts, the intensification of anti-Western feeling and 
the widening of indigenous disputes to the degree where they 
involve the risk of wider wars. Does the fear of opposition to 
Bangkok in Northeast Thailand really justify the presence ol 
enormous numbers of US servicemen and, ultimately, the risk 
of war with China and the worsening of US-Soviet relations? On 
any reasonable scale of values one would think not. Even if this 
US presence were deemed to be in Australia’s interests, would 
the Americans stay there anyway? Does the presence of 10,000 
Australian policemen in Southeast Asia affect American policy? 
If the Americans would  stay there anyway why spend 5 per cent 
of the GNP encouraging them to do so?
A nother alleged benefit of the US alliance is that the Americans 
provide technological know-how, skills and capital im portant for 
Australian development. No doubt, but would they provide it 
without the alliance? The American government has considerable 
difficulty controlling private enterprise. Despite the wreckage he 
has made of Franco-American relations De Gaulle has found it 
impossible to keep American capital out of France.
A stronger motive, if not benefit, is psychological. On the one 
hand the alliance provides a means for thrusting Australia into 
the mainstream of world politics, and of avoiding the neutrality 
which is regarded by many Australians as immoral, as Mr. 
W hitlam  had made clear in his pamphlet, Beyond Vietnam: Aus­
tralia’s Regional Responsibilities. On the other hand the guarantee 
of American assistance, however modified and bought at whatever 
cost, provides some comfort to offset the lurking fear that the 
yellow hordes may, after all, sweep south.
Finally, for the government the alliance provides a convenient 
and heavy stick with which to beat the ALP. At a time when the 
Labor Party has exorcised itself of all other demons radicalism, 
socialism and proletarianism, there remain only two points on 
which it is vulnerable: that A rthur Calwell and the Victorian 
executive remain in its ranks; and that it does not unequivocally 
support A ll the Way with LBJ’, or ‘W e’ll go a-waltzing M atilda 
with you.’.
If the US alliance does provide benefits one is then forced to 
ask what price Australia should pay for those benefits and, further,
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what extra cost is worth paying in order to m aintain the same 
benefits. In the 1950s Australia was receiving the same security 
guarantee without Vietnam, without large defence expenditure, 
w ithout mass sycophantic behaviour; an occasional verbal declar­
ation of support for W ashington sufficed. Has the new level of 
sacrifice been justified? To judge by Bury’s assertion that the 
F i l l  is a good plane at any price one might justifiably conclude 
that the government does not use cost benefit analysis. One needs 
to enquire whether the benefits of the US alliance could be 
obtained at a lower cost and whether Australian participation 
in the Vietnam debacle was not only unwise but also, even within 
the Government’s frame of reference, unneccessary. W hat are then 
the costs of the US alliance? These may be considered in three 
areas, political, diplomatic and strategic.
Politically, the alliance facilitates US intervention in Australian 
domestic politics. Such intervention is part and parcel of the diplo­
matic behaviour of great powers. T hat even a Labor government 
would not seriously threaten US interests keeps her intervention at 
a minimal level. But when it has been possible, for a small effort, 
to increase the likelihood of the Liberals’ m aintaining power, 
America lias utilised the opportunity. Two manoeuvres spring to 
mind. During the campaigns before the 1963 federal election, 
which was, expected to be a close run affair, defence matters, 
and particularly the deficiencies in Australia’s air strike force, 
received considerable publicity. T hen Menzies Government bought 
the F i l l  on an open ended contract which eventually led to a 
300 per cent increase in cost and a delay of 3 years in the promised 
delivery date. T he government made the most extravagant and 
ill-founded claims for the new plane which were generally accepted 
in large measure due to the Americans' silence on the matter. 
Further, the USAF flew to every capital city in Australia a 
number of B-47s, which the Government said Australia would 
be loaned at no cost until the F i l l  became available.
T h a t was the last Australia saw of the B-47s. T he effect of these 
ijianoeuvres on the 1963 election is impossible to determine; 
their purpose clear enough. T he 1966 election led to a similar 
strategy; the visit to L.B.J., H olt’s sycophantic reception, the 
poetry, the speeches, were all designed to ensure that the US 
alliance could be more easily used to beat the less fawning Labor 
Party.
These developments can perhaps be overestimated. Australia 
is in  large measure a democracy and external m anipulation of its 
political structure is difficult. But the US alliance, carefully 
cultivated as the u ltim ate guarantee of Australian security, coupled 
with the relatively even distrbution of support between govern­
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ment ancl opposition, does facilitate US involvement at crucial 
moments and increase the efficacy of that involvement when it 
does occur.
In  the diplomatic sphere the US alliance appears to be a less 
beneficial arrangement than the government would have us believe. 
First, while the US government has often been able to utilise 
Australian “loyalty” to avoid unilateral American action in  South­
east Asia — Laos and Vietnam provide the best examples — Can­
berra has found that on crucial issues the support of the Americans 
has not been forthcoming. In the case of West Irian Australia’s 
unwise objective of m aintaining the Dutch in the territory was 
torpedoed by US support for Indonesia; during confrontation 
Canberra found her ability to push the US towards a firmer policy 
on Sukarno was extremely limited, if not non-existent. Secondly, 
the claim that Canberra has a voice in US policy making has 
become patently fraudulent. W ithin days of Menzies’ publicly 
stated opposition to negotiations with Hanoi, Johnson offered to 
negotiate at any time, at any place. Johnson’s decision of 31 
March 1968 to open serious negotiations clearly took Canberra by 
surprise.
Thirdly, the US alliance has led Australian politicians into 
the mistake of regarding Southeast Asia as a region essentially 
bipolar in its power configuration and thus analogous to divided 
Europe. T he Philippines policy towards Sabah has tended to 
provide a corrective to this erroneous perception. T he tangled 
skein of Southeast Asian politics does not represent a simplistic 
division between two competing power blocs.
Fourthly, the alliance enables W ashington to provide Canberra 
with much of the information on which the latter bases its policy. 
Clearly, with its limited resources, Canberra is not in a position 
to make an independent analysis of every political development. 
T he shortage, indeed- lack of Vietnamese linguists led Australia 
to rely on American assessments of the situation in Vietnam. This 
inform ation could be tailored to suit American policy require­
ments; even if it were not, the inadequacies of W ashington’s own 
information is today only too apparent2.
Finally the US alliance has led to policies not apparently in 
Australian interests. The Vietnam commitment is justified 
ultimately by the needs of the US alliance. But what cost is Can­
berra prepared to pay for that alliance? Almost any policy can
-  An exam ination  of published m aterial should have m ade this clear long since. 
T h e  deficiencies in  America's inform ation gathering process are depicted in  David  
H alberstam ’s: M aking  of a Q uagm ire, w ritten  in  1964. Arthur Schlesinger later 
publicised the US Cabinet's ignorance in  T h e B itte r  H eritage: V ietnam  and  
A m erican  D em ocracy.
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be justified by reference to the improvement of the US guarantee. 
Does “me too-ism” really significantly increase the likelihood of 
US support for Australia in the event of an attack? And, even 
worse, does the US alliance increase the likelihood of such an 
attack materialising?
Which brings me to the third category of cost, strategic. I find 
it so beyond doubt that no Southeast Asian power, indeed no 
power, except America, is capable of invading Australia within the 
forseeable future that the subject hardly seems worth raising3.
T he technological developments necessary, the am ount of re­
sources required, are beyond any conceivable adversary’s capabilities 
and even then the reward, an enormous army of occupation at 
enormous cost, would not nearly warrant the effort. A more serious, 
and less widely considered possibility has been thrown up by the 
imperatives of the US alliance. In 1963 the Australian Government 
reluctantly revealed that a communications centre was to be built 
by the Americans at N orth West Cape on the West Australian 
coast. As this base, now operational, is for communicating with 
American < nuclear armed submarines targetted on Soviet central 
Asia, it placed Australia firmly in the central ‘balance of terror’ 
and, probably for the first time, exposed her to Russia’s nuclear 
strategy. Australia- at least the base, became an im portant nuclear 
target. Over the last year or so it has become clear that the instal­
lation at Pine Gap, not far from Alice Springs, is for the purpose 
of tracking and possibly guiding, American missiles taking the 
southerly route to China in order to avoid overflying Soviet 
territory4.
Australia has thus become integrally, and unnecessarily, involved 
in the Sino-US confrontation. T he Government, apparently having 
learned the lesson of the furore which the 1963 revelations pro­
duced, has revealed next to nothing about the matter, and infor­
m ation on Pine Gap has, like that on the F i l l  and the Vietnam 
war been gleaned from less secretive American official sources. 
I t  became public knowledge in Australia only after Australian 
manufacturers leaked the story, having been awarded only $3 
million in contracts of the total $200 million cost. T he rest was 
fully imported.
T he significance of these developments is threefold. First, 
they illustrate the fashion in which the government is prepared 
to escalate the cost of the US alliance with gay abandon, even to
'•i See M. Teichm ann: A spects of A ustralia's D efence, for a useful exam ination  
of this matter.
■i See R . J. Cooksey: ‘P ine G ap’, Australian  Q uarterly , Dec. 1968.
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the extent of making Australia a primary nuclear target. Second, 
they have been justified, when they have been admitted, by 
reference to the mythology of the US alliance rather than by rigor­
ous analysis of the costs involved and the benefits accruing. Third, 
they cast, like the F i l l  affair, like the whole Vietnam policy- 
like the V.I.P. aircraft, serious doubt on the credibility and 
veracity of the government’s assertions.
I am neither necessarily hostile to the Australian-American 
alliance nor absolutely opposed to Australian interventionist 
policies in Southeast Asia. I do not even expect our masters to 
adopt a ‘m oral’ foreign policy, for not only would it be the only 
state to ever make such an effort but politics, particularly in ter­
national politics, does not readily lend itself to such a posture. 
W hat one is entitled to expect is a more rigorous definition and 
analysis of Australian interests; a more credible public explanation 
of those interests and how they .are made operational; an abandon­
m ent of secrecy in strategic matters, at least to the extent that the 
Americans have been prepared to go and the acceptance on the 
part of both government and community that politics does not 
stop at the coast, that foreign policy is a political issue and that to 
criticise it is not to be “disloyal”5.
5 Interestingly Sir Alan W att, generally a supporter o f the G overnm ent’s foreign  
policy, makes sim ilar proposals, from a different standpoint, in  his Vietnam : 
An A u stralian  Analysis.
